Max Hill v. Willis Nakai : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2011
Max Hill v. Willis Nakai : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald J. Winder; Jerald V. Hale; Winder & Counsel, PC; Attorney for Willis Nakai; Charles M.
Bennett; Charles M. Bennett PLLC; Attorney for Max Hill.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Max Hill v. Willis Nakai, No. 20111125.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3146
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
WILLIAM J. HANNIFIN, 
Deceased. 
MAX HILL, as Special Administrator of 
the Estate, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIS NAKAI, Individually and as 
Personal Representative of the Estate, 
Appellee. 
Appellate Court Case No. 20111125-SC 
On Appeal from the Third District Court, 
Case No. 103900808 
Honorable Robert J. Hilder (Retired) 
Honorable Royal I. Hansen 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
1 Charles Bennett 
Charles M. Bennett, PLLC 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Max Hill, as Special 
Administrator of the Estate 
Donald J. Winder, #3519 
Jerald V.Hale, #8466 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
460 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Willis Nakai, Individually 
and as Personal Representative of the 
Estate 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 1 6 2012 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
*\ Nil l* FAH SUPREME COURT 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESI ATlToi-
Wn J LA M J. HANNIFIN 
Deceased. 
MAX HILL, as Special Administrator of 
the Estate, 
A ppellant, 
vs. 
WILLIS NAKAI, Individually and as 
Personal Representative of the Estate, 
Appellee. 
Charles Bennett 
Charles M. Bennett, PLLC 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Appellate Court ( use \* J 
On Appeal . .m: li-j .• \i •.: i-xvru 5. 
Case No. 103900808 
Honorable Robert J. Hilder (Retired) 
Honorable Royal I. Hansen 
Donald J. Winder, #3519 
Jerald V. Hale, #8466 
WINDER & COUNSEi . P ". 
460 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Willis Nakai, Individually 
and as Personal Representative of the 
Estate 
Attorney for Max TTill. as Special 
Administrator c»f u ie i • siato 
APPEI ,1 EE'S BRIEF 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LIST OF PARTIES 
Willis Nakai, for himself and as Personal Representative of the Estate 
Max Hill, for himself and as special administrator for the following nineteen 
collateral relatives of the deceased: 
Diane Brough 
Curtis Dean Shields 
Mary Ann Steadman 
York Shields 
Kathy Smith 
Rick Jens Jensen 
Tammi Farnsworth 
Teresa J. Pominski 
Jill Woods 
Stacey Oleska 
TimFernau 
Frederick R. Tasker 
Nan Swarts 
Merlin Vaun White 
Patrick White 
Cindy Post 
Scott Carpenter 
Josie Carpenter 
i i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION vii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES vii 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS viii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE x 
Proceedings before the Trial Court xi 
Trial Court Decision xiii 
Post Trial Proceedings xiii 
RELEVANT FACTS xiv 
ARGUMENT 1 
EQUITABLE ADOPTION REMAINS A VIABLE LEGAL CONCEPT 1 
CHANGES TO THE PROBATE CODE IN UTAH HAVE NOT 
OVERRULED THE EQUITABLE ADOPTION DOCTRINE 3 
Appellant's Cited Cases do not Establish an "Effective Overruling" of 
the Equitable Adoption Doctrine 7 
THE TRIAL CORUT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND APPLIED THE 
FACTS TO THE ACCEPTED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EQUITABLE 
ADOPTION IN DETERMINING NAKAI WAS EQUITABLY ADOPTED 
BY FATHER HANNIFIN 8 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded Mr. Nakai's Mother and 
Grandfather Relinquished Their Rights to Mr. Nakai 10 
i i i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Verbal and Specific Relinquishment of Parental Rights by Mr. Nakai's 
Father at the Time of the Agreement Not Required to Establish 
Equitable Adoption 14 
Trial Court Properly Applied the Facts of the Matter to the Williams 
Requirements 15 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO 
NAKAI PURSUANT TO HIS DESIGNATION AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE AND REMAND IS NOT APPROPRIATE 
REGARDLESS OF THE COURT'S DETERMINATIONS 16 
CONCLUSION 18 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24 19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 20 
ADDENDUM 21 
{ 
i v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Barlow v. Barlow, 463 P.2d 305 (Col. 1969) 14 
Coon v. American Compressed Steel, 133 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) 4, 5 
Ellison v. Thompson, 242 S.E.2d 95 (1978) 11 
Goebelv. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., 104 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2004) 2 
ifc7/wv./K//is,638P.2d516(Utahl981) 7 
Hughes v. Cafferty, 89 P.3d 148 (Utah 2004) 12, 13 
Hulsey v. Carter, 588 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 2003) 14 
In re Estate of Smith, 326 P.2d 400 (Utah 1958) 2 
In the Matter of the Interest ofJ.J.S., a Minor, 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, \ 40 (Navajo D. Ct. 
1983) 13 
Inre Gary's Estate, 111 P.2d 815 (Ariz. 1949) 12 
Inre Owens Estate, 91?. 283 (Utah 1907) 18 
In re Williams Estates, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960) 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10,11,14, 15, 16 
Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000) 4, 6 
Laneyv. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002) 1 
Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) 7 
Matter of Adoption ofHalloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) 12 
Olseth v.Larson, 158 P.3d 532 (Utah 2007) 5 
Poncho v. Bowdoin, 126 P.3d 1221 (Ct. App. N.M. 2005) 6 
Riding v. Riding, 329 P.2d 878 (Utah 1958) 8 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) 1, 3 
State v. Houston, 263 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) 5 
Van Natta v. Heywood, 195 P. 192 (Utah 1920) .. 6 
Statutes 
NEWMEX. S.ANN. §§ 45-1-101 (1993) . 5 
No. DAK. CIV. C. 30.1-01 (1973) 5 
UTAH CODE ANN. §75-1-102(1975) . 6 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201 (2004) 17 
UTAH CODE ANN. §75-2-103(1998) 2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114 (1998) 4 
UTAH CODE ANN. §75-2-514(1998) 6 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-718 (1992) 17 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-407 (2004) 7 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009) vii 
25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1982) 13 
Treatises 
122 A.L.R. 5th 205, "Modern Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by 
Estopple," (2004) 4 
v i i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether a basis exists for this Court to overturn the longstanding precedent 
of equitable adoption as detailed in In re Williams Estates, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960). 
Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002). 
2. Whether adoption by the state of Utah of the Uniform Probate Code, or 
other statutory enactments subsequent to the Williams decision, are inconsistent with the 
continued availability of equitable adoption in this jurisdiction. 
3. Whether a subsequent decision regarding the right of a child to support 
from his or her parents, Hillis v. Hillis, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981), is inconsistent with the 
continued applicability of equitable adoption in this jurisdiction. 
4. Whether the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact support its 
determination of the deceased's equitable adoption of Willis Nakai. In re Williams 
Estates, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960). 
5. Whether remand is appropriate to revisit the award of attorney fees and 
costs incurred on behalf of Mr. Nakai as personal representative of the estate. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-103 Share of Heirs Other Than Surviving Spouse 
(1) Any part of the intestate estate not passing to a decedent's surviving spouse under 
Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes in 
the following order to the individuals who survive the decedent: 
(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 
75-2-106(2); 
(b) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally if both survive, 
or to the surviving parent if only one survives; 
(c) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the decedent's 
parents or either of them per capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2-
106(3); 
(d) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, but the decedent 
is survived on both the paternal and maternal sides by one or more grandparents or 
descendants of grandparents: 
(i) half to the decedent's paternal grandparents equally if both survive, or to the surviving 
paternal grandparent if only one survives, or to the descendants of the decedent's paternal 
grandparents or either of them if both are deceased, the descendants taking per capita at 
each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2-106(3); and 
(ii) half to the decedent's maternal grandparents equally if both survive, to the surviving 
maternal grandparent if only one survives, or to the descendants of the decedent's 
maternal grandparents or either of them if both are deceased, the descendants taking per 
capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2-106(3); 
(e) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, but the decedent 
is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants of grandparents on the paternal 
but not the maternal side, or on the maternal but not the paternal side, to the decedent's 
relatives on the side with one or more surviving members in the same manner as the half 
described in Subsection (l)(d); 
(f) if there is no taker under Subsection (l)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), but the decedent has: 
(i) one deceased spouse who has one or more descendants who survive the decedent, the 
estate or part of the estate passes to that spouse's descendants who survive the decedent, 
the descendants taking per capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2-
106(4); or 
(ii) more than one deceased spouse who has one or more descendants who survive the 
decedent, an equal share of the estate or part of the estate passes to each set of 
descendants, the descendants taking per capita at each generation as defined in 
Subsection 75-2-106(4). 
(2) For purposes of Subsections (l)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) any nonprobate transfer, 
v i i i ! 
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as defined in Section 75-2-205, received by an heir is added to the probate estate in 
calculating the intestate heirs' shares and is conclusively treated as an advancement under 
Section 75-2-109 to the heir in determining the heir's share. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-114 (2) Parent and Child Relationship 
(2) An adopted individual is the child of the adopting parent or parents and not of the 
natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse of either natural parent has no effect 
on: 
(a) the relationship between the child and that natural parent; or 
(b) the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from or through the 
other natural parent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-514 Contracts Concerning Succession 
(1) A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die 
intestate, if executed after July 1, 1998, may be established only by: 
(a) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract; 
(b) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of 
the contract; or 
(c) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. 
(2) The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a 
contract not to revoke the will or wills. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-718(l)Compensation of personal representative and attorney 
(1) A personal representative and an attorney are entitled to reasonable compensation for 
their services. If a petition is filed which either directly or indirectly seeks approval of the 
personal representative's compensation or the attorney's compensation and if no objection 
is filed by an interested person to the compensation requested, reasonable compensation 
shall be the compensation sought in the petition. When an interested person objects to the 
personal representative's compensation, the court shall determine reasonable 
compensation for the personal representative based on the quality, quantity, and value of 
the services rendered to the estate and the circumstances under which those services were 
rendered, including the practice for other fiduciaries who are in similar circumstances to 
the personal representative in question. When an interested person objects to the 
attorney's compensation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation for the 
attorney based on rules adopted by the Judicial Council. 
ix 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201 (24) General Definitions 
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or 
the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes persons having 
priority for appointment as personal representative, other fiduciaries representing 
interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if living, or the settlor's legal representative, if any, 
if the settlor is living but incapacitated. The meaning as it relates to particular persons 
may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes 
of, and matter involved in, any proceeding. 
25 United States Code § 1901 (5) 
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody 
proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the 
essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing 
in Indian communities and families. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Willis Nakai and the deceased, Father William J. Hannifin, enjoyed a lifelong 
relationship until Father Hannifin's death in 2009. During his lifetime Father Hannifin 
ensured that the bulk of his assets, including his Episcopal life insurance policy, bank 
accounts and investment accounts, transferred to Mr. Nakai upon his death. Father 
Hannifin was never married and had no natural bom children. Mr. Nakai was appointed 
as personal administrator of the estate and petitioned the court for a determination of 
heirs. Mr. Nakai maintained that although no formal adoption occurred, he was equitably 
adopted by Father Hannifin. Max Hill, acting on behalf of himself and nineteen of the 
collateral heirs of Father Hannifin opposed a determination of an equitable adoption of 
x 
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Mr. Nakai by Father Hannifin arguing the concept was no longer valid in the state of 
Utah and, in any event, the facts did not support such a determination. 
Proceedings before the Trial Court 
On May 26, 2010, Willis Nakai, filed his verified Application for Informal 
Appointment as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Hannifin. R.1-20. On 
July 30, 2010, the Court entered an "Order of Appointment of Personal Representative." 
R.29-30. Following entry of the Order of Appointment, on August 4, 2010, the Reverend 
Canon Caryl Marsh, contested Mr. Nakai's appointment as Personal Representative and 
filed on August 4, 2010 a pleading entitled "Ex-Parte: Notice of Interested Persons and 
Heirs; Request for Hearing; Motion for Restraining Order to Prevent Access to Estate 
Assets; Award of Attorney fees," claiming to act on behalf of some of Father Hannifm's 
"rightful" heirs. R. 35-39. In conjunction with her Ex Parte filing, Canon Marsh also 
submitted an "Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Vacate Appointment 
and Letters." R. 41-44. The trial court modified the proposed language of the Order to 
requesting the appointment be set aside, ordering "subject to further court determinations 
in relation to this proceeding, the Appointment of Mr. Willis Nakai as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of William Hannifin is stayed." R. 42, f^ 1. After additional 
pleadings and hearings, the trial court issued an Order on September 27, 2010 in which it 
continued Mr. Nakai's appointment as personal representative for the purpose of 
gathering assets and paying outstanding bills. R. 196-198. 
x i 
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On October 29, 2010, counsel for Canon Marsh submitted Notice of Withdrawal 
of Counsel. R. 237. On November 12, 2010, Mr. Nakai filed a Petition for Adjudication 
of Intestacy and Determination of Heirs. R. 242-303. On November 29, 2010, Canon 
Marsh notified the trial court by letter she was no longer a party to the case and no longer 
represented any collateral relatives. R. 304. 
On December 28, 2010, Appellant Max Hill, filed his "Petition for Order: (i) 
Appointing Max Hill Special Administrator with Limited Duties; (ii) Approving Heirs 
Private Agreement for Distribution of Estate; (iii) for Approval of Contingent Fee 
Agreement; and (iv) for Miscellaneous Relief." R. 316-343. Appellant sought 
appointment as the Special Administrator of the estate with the limited duty and power to 
represent nineteen of Father Hannifin's collateral relatives to contest Mr. Nakai's claim to 
the estate. Id. The trial court approved the appointment of Appellant as Special 
Administrator, and approving the fee agreement requested by Appellant and counsel by 
its order dated January 19, 2011. R. 381 -383. 
Mr. Nakai filed his "First Application for Attorney Fees and Costs as Personal 
Representative," on March 4, 2011 (R. 393-405) to which Appellant filed a Response in 
Opposition on March 17, 2011. R. 406-414. Mr. Nakai Supplemented his First 
Application for Attorney Fees and Costs as Personal Representative on July 18, 2011. R. 
480-487. The trial court, the Honorable Robert J. Hilder presiding, held a bench trial on 
July 21, 2011 addressing Mr. Nakai's claim to inheritance as an equitably adopted child 
and his application for attorney fees. 
x i i 
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Trial Court Decision 
On July 27, 2011, the trial court entered its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Ruling and Order," {hereinafter "Findings") R. 566-581. Following the controlling 
precedent of In re Williams Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P .2d 683 (Utah 1960), the trial 
court determined Mr. Nakai was entitled to be treated as Father Hannifin's equitably 
adopted son, and as such was the sole beneficiary of Father Hannifin's estate, and granted 
him attorney fees (payable from the estate). Id. On August 1, 2011, the trial court entered 
a "Ruling and Order Attorney Fees" further detailing its reasoning for awarding attorney 
fees to Mr. Nakai. R. 582-85. 
Post Trial Proceedings 
On August 4, 2011, Appellant filed a "Motion for a New Trial Asking the Court to 
Amend the Court's July 27, 2011 Ruling Based on an Error of Law" (R. 586-589) with 
accompanying Memorandum (R. 590-624). The trial court1 conducted a hearing on the 
Motion and entered its Order denying Appellant's Motion on December 15, 2011. R.722-
728. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on December 29, 2011. R. 729. 
1
 At the time the hearing was held on Appellant's Motion, the Honorable Judge Robert 
Hilder had retired and the case was reassigned to the Honorable Judge Royal Hansen, 
who ruled on the Motion. 
x i i i 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
1. William J. Hannifin was born August 3, 1930. He became a deacon in the 
Episcopal Church in 1954 and a Priest in 1955. He lived his entire life serving his 
church. Findings R. 566,11. 
2. Father Hannifin never married and had no biological children. Id. 
3. Willis Nakai was born May 13, 1944 to Hilda Nakai and Tony Begay. Mr. 
Nakai is and was a member of the Navajo Tribe. Findings R. 566, f 2; 567, |4 . 
4. Father Hannifin spent much of his life in communication with and often in 
close proximity to Native American people, including many Navajos. Findings R. 566, ]f 
3. 
5. Father Hannifin first met Mr. Nakai around 1956, when Mr. Nakai was 12 
years old after Mr. Nakai enrolled in the Intermountain Indian School ("IIS") in Brigham 
City, Utah. Findings, R.567, f3. 
6. Mr. Nakai was raised from infancy by his childless aunt until her tragic 
death when he was five or six years old. Although deemed to be under custody of his 
mother Hilda and his maternal grandparents, Mr. Nakai was thereafter sent to a series of 
boarding schools, including IIS in Brigham City and spent very little time actually 
residing with either his parents or his grandparents. Findings R. 567, ^ flf 5-6. 
7. In the summer of 1958, Father Hannifin drove to the Navajo Reservation 
near Aneth, Utah, to transport several children, including Mr. Nakai, to attend Camp 
x i v 
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Tuttle, a youth camp near Salt Lake City sponsored by the Episcopal Church. Findings 
R. 567-568, U 7. 
8. At the time of the visit, Mr. Nakai was living with his mother and/or his 
maternal grandparents. Findings, R. 568, ^  8. 
9. During this visit 1958, Father Hannifin had a conversation with Mr. 
Nakai's mother and maternal grandfather regarding Mr. Nakai. Findings, R. 568, ^  9. 
10. Mr. Nakai's father Tony was not very involved in the family and was 
working for the railroad and frequently away from home. Mr. Begay was not a party to 
the 1958 conversation. Findings, R. 568, ffl[ 8, 10. 
11. Although there were difficulties in understanding occasioned by the parties 
respective primary languages, the gist of the conversation was that Mr. Nakai's mother 
asked Father Hannifin to take Mr. Nakai, who at the time was fourteen years old, and 
raise him as his own child. Findings, R. 568, ^ [ 9, 11. 
12. Father Hannifin agreed to take Mr. Nakai on the condition that Mr. Nakai's 
family "take me as one of your children, as one of your relatives." Findings, R. 568-69, j^ 
11. 
13. Mr. Nakai did not immediately transition to the custody of Father Hannifin 
at the time of the conversation in the summer of 1958, but did move to IIS during the 
school year and began his lifelong involvement with Father Hannifin, with Father 
Hannifin assuming a parental role over Mr. Nakai. Findings, R. 569, <[fl[ 13-14. 
XV 
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14. Because Mr. Nakai was attending boarding school at this time, he initially 
would spend weekends and holidays with Father Hannifin at his home. Findings, R. 570 
115. 
15. After a period of time, Mr. Nakai developed some health problems. He 
then moved into Father Hannifin's home, which became Mr. Nakai's full time home for 
the remainder of his secondary education and throughout his college education at Utah 
State University. Findings, R. 570, f 5. 
16. Mr. Nakai continued to live with Father Hannifin until Mr. Nakai's 
marriage on January 25, 1969. Findings, R. 570, f 15. 
17. While attending IIS, the Bureau of Indian Affairs paid all of Mr. Nakai's 
tuition, books, and boarding expenses. However, Father Hannifin consistently provided 
emotional and material support for Mr. Nakai as a father would for a son. Throughout all 
the remaining years of Mr. Nakai's minority and even subsequently, Father Hannifin 
provided an allowance, food, clothing, medical care as necessary, and transportation. 
Father Hannifin taught Mr. Nakai to Drive, monitored his schoolwork, made all decisions 
regarding activities in which Mr. Nakai participated and generally provided for his health 
and welfare. Findings, R. 570-71, f 16. 
18. From the time Mr. Nakai returned to IIS in 1958 and commenced his life 
with Father Hannifin, Mr. Nakai referred to Father Hannifin as his father, or "dad" and 
Father Hannifin referred to Mr. Nakai as his son. Findings, R. 571, % 17. 
x v i 
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19. At all times both Mr. Nakai and Father Hannifin held themselves out to the 
community and to family as father and son. Findings, R. 571, ^ 19. 
20. Father Hannifin assumed the role of and actively participated as a father to 
Mr. Nakai, and later as grandfather to Mr. Nakai's children. Id. 
21. Mr. Nakai's parents agreed to relinquish all their rights to the child to 
Father Hannifin as demonstrated by the supporting factual determinations: 
(a) Mr. Nakai's biological mother and maternal grandfather agreed to give custody 
and control of Mr. Nakai to Father Hannifin and asked him to raise Mr. Nakai as his own 
child. 
(b) Mr. Nakai's biological mother and maternal grandfather sent Mr. Nakai into 
Father Hannifin's permanent care just a few months after making the agreement to adopt. 
(c) Neither Mr. Nakai's biological mother, biological father, nor his maternal 
grandparents, ever again sought to exercise physical custody or control over Mr. Nakai. 
No effort was ever made to return Mr. Nakai to their custody and control. This is true 
even though Mr. Nakai's biological parents remained married until his mother's death, 
when Mr. Nakai was a mature adult. 
(d) Except for a very short time in his life, Mr. Nakai never lived with his 
biological parents for any extended period. In fact, from his earliest infancy he was with 
his aunt. Following her death, he was sent to boarding school. He was nominally in the 
custody of his mother and father and perhaps his maternal grandparents, but for most of 
xvii 
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his life, except for a short time after the summer of 1958, Mr. Nakai was not in the 
custody of his biological family, except for the early years with his aunt. 
(e) After physical relinquishment of custody to Father Hannifin Mr. Nakai's 
biological parents provided him with virtually no support. 
Findings, R.573-74, f 24 
22. In the Navajo tradition, under which Mr. Nakai, his parents and 
grandparents were raised and in which they lived, adoption within families is not 
uncommon, but Navajo parents never voluntarily relinquish their rights to their children 
when it does occur. Findings, R.575, f 25. 
23. In the context of this ancient tradition, and in light of the conversations that 
took place in 1958 and the parties' subsequent actions, Mr. Nakai's biological mother and 
maternal grandfather agreed to relinquish all practical parental rights to the child. 
Findings, R.576,t 27-28. 
24. Mr. Nakai's father, Tony Begay, relinquished his rights to the child as well 
as demonstrated by the supporting factual determinations; 
(a) Up to and prior to the 1958 discussions Tony Begay never participated actively 
in his son's life; 
(b) Although he was present on the property at the time the 1958 discussion 
occurred, he made no effort to take part and he never objected to the placement of Mr. 
Nakai with Father Hannifin; 
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(c) Tony Begay's conduct was consistent with the Navajo custom of a matriarchal 
structure, and determination of clan structure through maternal bloodlines. 
(d) There was no evidence to suggest Mr. Begay expected to be more active in the 
placement decision. Findings, R.576, j^ 30. 
25. Mr. Nakai submitted a First Application for Attorney Fees and Costs as 
Personal Representative, R. 393-405, and a Supplement to First Application for Attorney 
Fees and Costs as Personal Representative. R. 480-487. 
26. Regarding the fees requested, the trial court determined: 
(a) The work done was clearly explained, and nothing suggested the work done 
was inappropriate in any way; 
(b) Under the unusual circumstances of the case, the personal representative's 
counsel did only what was needed; 
(c) The billing rates of the personal representative's counsel are eminently fair; 
(d) The outcome of the case vindicates the personal representative's litigation and 
administration decisions. 
(e) The costs or expenses incurred by personal representative's counsel were 
necessary and appropriate. 
R. 582-583. 
x i x 
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ARGUMENT 
L EQUITABLE ADOPTION REMAINS A VIABLE LEGAL CONCEPT. 
Appellant has failed to establish a valid basis to overturn the prior precedence of 
this Court recognizing the concept of equitable adoption as detailed in In re Williams 
Estates, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960). Under Utah law, and the doctrine of stare decisis, to 
which Appellant has cited, "those asking [the Court] to overturn prior precedent have a 
substantial burden of persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). 
This Court "will not overturn precedent 'unless clearly convinced that the rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent.'" Laney v. Fairview City, 57 
P.3d 1007, (Utah 2002) (citing Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398 (quoting Hanna, John, The Role 
of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L.Rev. 367, 367 (1957)). In this matter, 
Appellant has failed to meet this burden to overturn the prior precedent of the Williams 
case and the concept of equitable adoption remains viable in this jurisdiction. 
The underpinnings of the statutory nature of adoption existed prior to, and at the 
time of, the Williams decision. The right of an individual to testamentary disposition of 
his or her property existed at the time of the Williams decision, and the concept that 
property may be disposed of by will has no relevance to equitable adoption. Further, this 
matter does not involve a will. Determinations regarding equitable adoption in the 
context of a will, as would any determinations regarding intestacy in the same context, 
would be nothing more than an advisory opinion. As this Court has repeatedly held, "We 
1 
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generally do not decide issues unnecessary to the outcome of the case, see Provo City 
Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735 (Utah 2004) (finding the court of appeals' discussion of 
an issue to be merely advisory in nature where the court of appeals' conclusion on 
the issue ;lack[ed] . . . any meaningful effect to the parties'), and we are disinclined to 
issue advisory opinions, Miller v. Weaver, 66 p.3d 592 (Utah 2003)." Goebel v. Salt 
Lake City Southern R. Co., 104 P.3d 1185, 1196 (Utah 2004) (citations in original). 
Reference to wills and will statutes lacks any meaningful effect to the parties in this 
matter, and is misplaced. 
Neither does anything cited by Appellant establish any type of legislative or 
societal indication of a shift in the basic tenets of adoption and intestate succession. In 
fact, if anything, the scope of intestate succession is expanding rather than contracting. 
For example, at the time of the Williams decision, the law in Utah limited intestate 
succession by adopted children to their adoptive parents, but not the adoptive parents' 
parents, as adoptive children were not "issue" as defined by the statute. See e.g., In re 
Estate of Smith, 326 P.2d 400, 406 (Utah 1958) (upholding prior decision of court 
construing statute). Conversely, the Utah probate code now refers to "descendants" 
rather than "issue" to allow for full intestate succession rights for adopted children. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-103 (1998). The Uniform Law Comments note specifically, 
"the word 'descendants' replaces the word 'issue' in this Section and throughout the 
revisions of Article II. . . . Now that inheritance rights, in certain cases, are extended to 
adopted children, the term descendants is a more appropriate term." UNIFORM LAW 
2 
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COMMENTS, UPC § 2-103. The broadening of the inheritance rights of adoptees 
controverts Appellant's position changes in the probate code invalidate the equitable 
adoption concept. 
As noted in Appellant's brief, the majority of states have adopted, and continue to 
apply, the doctrine of equitable adoption. See Appellant's Brief at p. 1, citing 122 A.L.R. 
5th 205, "Modern Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estopple," 
(2004). Appellant cannot claim, and has not shown, "the rule was originally erroneous or 
is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will 
come by departing from precedent." See State v. Menzies, supra. Consequently, 
Appellant has failed to establish a basis for overturning the Court's precedence in this 
area. Equitable adoption in Utah, as with other states, is applicable in limited situations 
to effect the principle that equity regards as done what should have been done, and is 
simply a mechanism "to award a child the same distributive share of the adoptive parents' 
estate as it would have been entitled to had the child actually been adopted . . . ." 
Williams, supra, at p. 684. Legislative changes in the distributive share available to a 
statutorily adopted child, while potentially changing the amount of the share, do not 
change or invalidate the concept. For these reasons, the Court should decline to overrule 
the precedent of the Williams decision. 
II. CHANGES TO THE PROBATE CODE IN UTAH HAVE NOT 
OVERRULED THE EQUITABLE ADOPTION DOCTRINE. 
Appellant's legal arguments to the effect equitable adoption should be overturned 
3 
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based on changes to the Utah Probate Code are similarly faulty. Appellant cites to the 
Uniform Probate Code in an attempt to color equitable adoption as a procedure which 
circumvents the statutory requirements of statutory adoption, or which endows equitable 
adoption with rights and responsibilities mimicking statutory adoption. Equitable 
adoption, however, is not, and has never been, a replacement for statutory adoption. 
Application of the doctrine is limited to narrow circumstances to effect its purpose. As 
noted in the North Dakota case, Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D. 2000), 
equitable adoption "is not intended to create the legal relationship of parent and child, 
with all its attendant consequences, and does not effect a legal adoption." Thus, 
attempting to argue for a overturning of prior precedence based on readings of statutes 
related to formal adoptions fails. 
A recent Missouri case, Coon v. American Compressed Steel, 133 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2004) clearly describes the concept. "While an adoption is effective for all 
purposes, an equitable adoption . . . addresses only the particular property right in 
question in the proceeding and does not address the status of the parent-child 
relationship." Id. at 81 (citation omitted). "An adoption is an action in rem, which is 
binding on the whole world and entitles the adoptee to all the rights tied with the status of 
legal adoption. An equitable adoption, in contrast, is a result of an in personam 
proceeding binding only on the parties to the action in which it is conducted and those in 
privity with them." Id. (emphasis in original, citations omitted). "[T]he proceeding is 
brought in the court having jurisdiction over the deceased's estate . . . and is an ancillary 
4 
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part of the proceedings to administer the estate . . . . Equitable adoption is a principle and 
rule of equity only." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
It should also be noted, had the legislature intended to overturn Williams, it could 
have easily modified the language of the Probate Code to specifically accomplish this. 
See State v. Houston, 263 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) ("[w]e presume the 
Legislature is aware of our case law." (citing Olseth v. Larson, 158 P.3d 532 (Utah 
2007)); see also Olseth, 158 P.3d at 539 (noting if legislature wants to change statute, it is 
always free to do so, but rather it has accepted the court's interpretation of the statute at 
issue for almost ninety years). No provision in the Probate Code mentions, let alone 
abolishes, equitable adoption. As the legislature has not specifically abolished equitable 
adoption in the more than 50 years since the Williams case, there is no basis for this Court 
to assume such legislative intent through a tortured reading of the statutes. 
Further, other jurisdictions which, like Utah, have adopted the Uniform Probate 
Code continue to recognize the application and viability of equitable adoption within that 
legal framework. For example, New Mexico and North Dakota have both adopted the 
Uniform Probate Code, including Article II. See NEWMEX. S. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 (1993), 
et seq:, No. DAK. Civ. C. 30.1-01 (1973), et seq. Despite the adoption of the Uniform 
Probate Code, both states continue to recognize equitable adoption. See e.g., Poncho v. 
2
 Appellant cites, for example, the legislature's intent that an adopted child "inherit only 
from the adopting parent." But see Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-114 (2), "An adopted 
individual is the child of the adopting parent or parents and not of the natural parents, but 
adoption of a child by the spouse of either natural parent has no effect on: . . . (b) the 
right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from the other natural parent. 
5 
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Bowdoin, 126 P.3d 1221 (Ct. App. N.M. 2005). See also, Johnson, supra, 617 N.W.2d 
97 (N.D. 2000) (noting North Dakota law clearly recognizes the doctrine of equitable 
adoption). In fact, despite Appellant's incomplete cite to UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-102 
(2) (1975) (see Appellant's Brief at p. 8), rather than being inconsistent with the Probate 
Code's stated purpose, equitable adoption supports the stated purpose "to discover and 
make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§75-l-102(2)(b)(1975). 
Neither does the enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-701; repealed and 
reenacted as § 75-2-514; L. 1998, ch. 39, § 57, support overturning Williams. Beyond the 
bases cited herein, supra, to the effect equitable adoption is not a judicially created 
analog to statutory adoption, an agreement to adopt is not of the same character as an 
agreement to a contract concerning succession. An agreement to adopt is based on "the 
adoptive parents' agreement to adopt such child and to care and provide for it the same as 
though it were their own child." Williams, supra, 348 P.2d at 684. Conversely, a 
contract concerning succession can be alleged in many circumstances with consideration 
being as simple as providing services for the deceased. See e.g., Van Natta v. Heywood, 
195 P. 192 (Utah 1920). The legislature's specific limitations on contracts for succession 
as detailed in UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-514 (1998) are based on particular problems 
associated with such contracts and do not pronounce a broad repudiation of equitable 
adoption. See UNIFORM LAW COMMENTS, UPC § 2-514 (Oral contracts not to revoke 
wills have given rise to much litigation in a number of states). Neither does the Utah 
6 
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Probate Code ban all oral contracts. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-407 (2004) ("except as 
required by a statute other than this chapter, a trust need not be evidenced by a trust 
instrument"); see also, Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983) ("part 
performance allows a court in equity to enforce an oral agreement"). In sum, the 
adoption of the Uniform Probate Code in Utah, both in general and in terms of specific 
statutes related to intestate succession, does not equate to a repudiation of the equitable 
concepts outlined in the Williams case. For these reasons, the Court should decline to 
overrule In re Williams Estates. 
A. Appellant's Cited cases do not establish an "Effective Overruling" of 
the Equitable Adoption Doctrine. 
Appellant claims this Court's pronouncement regarding child support in Hillis v. 
Hillis, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981) effectively overruled the doctrine of equitable adoption. 
However, Hillis v. Hillis, and related cases, do not correlate to the concept of equitable 
adoption, nor do these cases represent a change in the law that would affect the ability of 
a parent to place their child with adoptive parents. As noted in Appellant's brief, Hillis 
dealt with a divorcing father attempting to be relieved of his child support obligations 
through an agreement with the child's mother. Hillis, 638 P.2d at 516. The holding in 
Hillis and related cases was simple, the right to support belongs to a child, and a parent 
determined to have parental obligations to that child cannot merely stipulate to avoid that 
responsibility. Id. at 517. Conversely, the holding in Hillis has no effect whatsoever on a 
parent's right to give a child up for adoption. 
7 
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Of even greater import for purposes of Appellant's argument in this regard, Hillis 
does not represent a change in the law related to a child's right to support. The Hillis 
court cited to case law dating back to 1965 in support of its holding. In fact, the legal 
position of Hillis predates the Williams case establishing equitable adoption. See e.g., 
Riding v. Riding, 329 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1958) (holding father cannot be relieved of the 
obligation to support his child except under the adoption statute). At the time of the 
Williams decision, the Court was well aware of the legal basis upon which Hillis v. Hillis 
was decided. Then, as now, the statutory restrictions related to child support or adoption 
to not preclude application of the principle of equitable adoption under certain limited 
circumstances. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND APPLIED THE 
FACTS TO THE ACCEPTED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EQUITABLE 
ADOPTION IN UTAH IN DETERMINING NAKAI WAS EQUITABLY 
ADOPTED BY FATHER HANNIFIN. 
The trial court was well aware of the requirements of the Williams case, and noted 
its July 27, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Findings" R. 566-
581), "all parties agree the primary authority for Utah's equitable adoption doctrine is the 
case of In re Williams Estates, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah I960)." See Findings. R. 572-73 If 
22. 
Pursuant to Williams, a party may establish an adoption without formal 
proceedings under certain circumstances. As this Court stated: 
[I]t is generally recognized that where a child's parents agree with adoptive 
parents to relinquish all their rights to the child in consideration of the 
8 
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adoptive parents' agreement to adopt such child, and to care and provide for 
it the same as though it were their own child, and such agreement is fully 
performed by all parties connected which such contract except there is no 
actual adoption, the courts will decree specific performance of such 
contract and thereby award to the child the same distributive share of the 
adoptive parents' estate as it would have been entitled to had the child 
actually been adopted as agreed. 
Id. 684. Appellant's basic premise from which his arguments flow is that a valid 
enforceable contact must be determined to be "valid when executed" regarding promises 
made and promises fulfilled. Appellant ignored and failed to mention the clear direction 
in Williams and in other cases to the effect a contract to adopt "may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence," {Id.), and instead propounds his own set of requirements which 
he claims must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Appellant's Brief at p. 
14. The Williams court made clear the difficulties in working from the inception of the 
contract under circumstances as exist here, because the parties to the contract may be 
deceased, it is not necessary that "the court first have direct proof of the making of the 
contract, and then proceed forward from the contract thus established to the conduct 
evidencing its existence." Id. at 685 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 223 F.775, 776 (8th 
Cir. 1915)). Rather, "it is possible to reverse that process, and if the statements and 
conduct of the adopting parents are such to furnish clear and satisfactory proof that an 
agreement of adoption must have existed, then the agreement may be found as an 
inference from that evidence." Id. at 86. The trial court correctly concluded, based on 
the unrefuted evidence in the trial, the conduct and statements of Father Hannifin 
throughout his life as well as those of Mr. Nakai and his parents, working back to the date 
9 
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of the agreement, provide clear and convincing evidence an agreement of adoption must 
have existed. These facts are clearly laid out in the trial court's Findings. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded Mr. Nakai's Mother and 
Grandfather Relinquished Their Rights to Mr. Nakai. 
Appellant argues the contract to adopt was void because the trial court made a 
finding "there was no formal relinquishment" by Mr. Nakai's mother and grandfather, 
precluding a legal conclusion there was an agreement to adopt. See Appellant's Brief at 
p. 15. Once again, however, Appellant ignores the language of the Williams decisions in 
making this argument. Specifically, Williams notes the child's parents must agree to 
"relinquish all their rights to the child." Id. at 684. As the trial court noted, and as is 
clear from the Williams case and others wherein the doctrine is considered, "the Court 
does not require proof that a formal relinquishment occur, otherwise there would be a 
formal adoption." Findings, R. 575, ^ 26. Facts regarding the relinquishment of the 
child, "as other facts, may be proved by circumstantial evidence . . . ." Williams at 684. 
Tellingly, the facts in Williams do not show a "formal" relinquishment. Rather, 
relinquishment was determinable by the actions and statements of the parties. See 
Williams, supra, at 685 (noting mother placed child in care of the Williams, returned a 
year later to retrieve child but did not when Williams asked that child stay with them, 
mother never attempted to regain custody of child).3 
Mr. Nakai recognizes the Williams Court did not make factual determinations as this 
was before the Court on an appeal of a grant of summary judgment, however, neither did 
the Court opine appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for want of a 
10 
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There is no legal support for Appellant's contention that certain talismanic words 
be used at the time of the adoption agreement to establish a formal relinquishment of 
rights to the child. What parties to such an agreement have ever heard of the word 
"relinquishment," let alone are aware of the legal meaning of the term? Rather, it is the 
conduct of the parties over time, going back to the time the agreement was initiated, that 
establishes this determination, and which the trial court correctly determined herein. The 
trial court made specific factual findings supporting the determination an agreement to 
relinquish rights to the child, as required under Williams, existed. See Findings, R. 575 f^ 
14. 
Further, the trial court correctly concluded Father Hannifin's agreement to take 
Mr. Nakai and raise him as his owns on met the requirements of equitable adoption. See 
Findings, R. 569-59 f^ 11. Williams requires only the "agreement to adopt such child, and 
to care and provide for it the same as though it was their own child." Id. at 684. 
Appellant's arguments, without legal support, to the effect Father Hannifin's promises 
amount only to a foster parent agreement are semantic arguments at best, and ignore not 
only the totality of facts determined by the trial court, but also the long established basis 
for the concept of equitable adoption. See e.g., Ellison v. Thompson, 242 S.E.2d 95, 96-
97 (1978) (stating the principle was first recognized in Georgia in 1913 when it was 
applied to allow a child to participate in the estate of a foster parent). 
Neither does equitable adoption require a parent to sever all contact with a child a 
definitive determination of formal relinquishment. 
11 
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requirement to establish relinquishment of parental rights. Appellant fails to cite to any 
legal support for this contention. Even in the context of a statutory adoption, contact with 
birth parents is not determinative of a relinquishment of rights. See e.g., In re Gary's 
Estate, 211 P.2d 815, 820 (Ariz. 1949) (noting as part of contract to adopt, grandmother 
surrendered legal and technical custody of appellant to the deceased based on his 
promises, but kept physical custody of appellant at request of deceased while he was 
away working as a lineman). See also, Matter of Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 
972, n. 11 (Utah 1986) (noting with approval the concept of "open adoption" which 
allows for communication between natural parent and child as child grows up). 
In a footnote, Appellant makes passing reference to the trial court's consideration 
of Navajo culture as "granting a privileged status to Navajos" in application of equitable 
adoption not available to Non-Navajos. See Appellant's Brief at p. 17. However, in 
making determinations as to the agreements between the parties, who have never heard of 
the Williams case, and who may have no concept of relinquishing rights to a child, it is 
appropriate for a court, in equity, to consider the context in which the agreement is made. 
See generally, Hughes v. Cafferty, 89 P.3d 148, 153 (Utah 2004) (obligation of court 
sitting in equity is to effectuate a result that serves equity given the overall facts and 
circumstances of the individual case). The trial court found Father Hannifin "spent much 
of his life in communication with and often in proximity, to Native American people, 
including many Navajo people." Findings, R. 567 f 3. As expressed through his 
statements to Mr. Nakai's mother (Findings, R. 568-69 \ 11), Father Hannifin understood 
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Navajo culture and Navajo Common Law in that adoption "is not concerned with the 
termination of parental rights or creating a legalistic parent and child relationship because 
those concepts are irrelevant in a system which has obligation to children that extends 
beyond parents. . . . The mechanism [of adoption] is informal and practical and based 
upon community expectation founded in religious and cultural belief." In the Matter of 
the Interest of U.S., a Minor, 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, \ 40 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983). "Many 
Navajo adoptions have a different focus than Anglo-European law. As such, it is not 
principally concerned with the exchange of legal parents. Navajo adoption is based on 
need, mutual love and help. Children may or may not change the surname. Either way 
the family is a unit with strong, supportive, extended family and clan ties. It has worked 
for hundreds of years without adoption agencies and courts of law." Id. f^lf 36-37., 
The federal government acknowledged the need to recognize these cultural 
differences in passing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 
(1982)) wherein Congress noted "the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over 
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often 
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and 
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families." 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (5). It 
would be inappropriate in this context, therefore, to disregard the context in which this 
equitable adoption took place, within the Navajo Nation and culture. This understanding 
as expressed by the trial court recognizes the realities of this particular situation, as any 
court sitting in equity should do. See Hughes, supra, 89 P.3d at 153 (Utah 2004) (noting 
13 
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cases in equity afford courts discretion and wide latitude in fashioning equitable 
remedies). 
B. Verbal and Specific Relinquishment of Parental Rights at the 
Time of the Agreement by Mr. Nakai's Father Not Required to 
Establish Equitable Adoption. 
Appellant's related point, that the adoption agreement fails because Mr. Nakai's 
birth father Tony Begay, failed to consent to the adoption, is similarly without support 
and attempts to force the concept of equitable concept into the strict construction 
requirements of statutory adoptions. Once again, the Court need not look further than the 
Williams case to determine such consent can be determined by the actions of the parties 
after the inception of the adoption agreement. See Williams, supra, at 686 (finding 
mother placed child in the Williams' custody, mother married at time and later divorced 
from father, Williams' raising child with the knowledge of the father and the consent of 
the mother). See also, Barlow v. Barlow, 463 P.2d 305, 309 (Col. 1969) (as the doctrine 
of equitable adoption comes under the category of equity, consent can be established by 
conduct); Hulsey v. Carter, 588 S.E.2d 717, 718 (Ga. 2003) (natural mother alone may 
contract for equitable adoption when it is shown natural father acquiesced). 
It is uncontroverted Nakai's birth father acquiesced to this adoption and never 
questioned the arrangement as the trial court found. The facts as determined by the trial 
court are clear in establishing Mr., Begay "never actively participated in his son's life and 
although he was present on the property at the time the discussion occurred, he made no 
effort to take part and he never objected to the placement of Mr. Nakai with Father 
14 
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Hannifin." Findings, R. 576, ^ 30. As in the Williams case and others, Mr. Begay's 
knowledge and acquiescence of the adoption of Mr. Nakai by Father Hannifin is borne 
out by his conduct and actions subsequent to the agreement to adopt. Findings, R. 573, f^ 
24; 576,1| 30. 
C. Trial Court Properly Applied the Facts of the Matter to the Williams 
Requirements. 
The trial court properly applied the facts of this case to the Williams case factors to 
determine an equitable adoption did in fact occur. Contrary to Appellant's position, 
Williams does not stand for the proposition, an equitable adoption occurs "if and only if 
there is no formal adoption." Appellant's Brief at p. 19. Equitable adoption does not 
require the parties to comply with every statutory requirement for formal adoption, other 
than the presentation of a petition before a court. Rather the equitable concept, as clearly 
defined in Williams, is that the parties intended for the adoptive parents to "care and 
provide for [the child] the same as though it were their own child and such agreement 
was fully performed by all the parties connected with such contract, except there is no 
actual adoption . . ." Id. at 684. The protections of equitable adoption are not for the 
benefit of the birth parents or the adoptive parents, they are for the child placed in this 
situation that allow him to participate in the estate of his adoptive parents. There is no 
discussion in Williams, of the statutory requirements for adoption and compliance with or 
disregard of such requirements. Appellant's attempt to rely on such statutory 
requirements to support his position mischaracterizes the holding of the Williams, the 
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basis for the concept, and fails to establish a legal basis for his requested relief. 
The trial court was aware of, and cited to, the proper Supreme Court precedence, 
In re Williams Estate, in determining the facts supported a determination of an equitable 
adoption. The trial court did not, as suggested by Appellant, refuse to apply the 
requirements of Williams, but rather, recognized equitable adoption is an equitable and 
fluid concept based on the "doctrine that equity regards as done what should have been 
done." Williams, supra at 684. Sitting in equity, the trial court was not asked to 
determine whether all statutory requirements for formal adoption were followed, but 
rather, to determine whether "the statements and conduct of the adopting parents are such 
as to furnish clear and satisfactory proof that an agreement must have existed." Id. at 
685. The facts as established at trial in this matter clearly show the Court appropriately 
applied these accepted and uncontroverted facts to this legal framework for equitable 
adoption. Compliance with the statutory requirements for de jure adoptions is not 
required, and does not work to establish the trial court's determinations in this regard 
"violated the doctrine of stare decisis." For these reasons, the Court should uphold the 
trial court's determinations in this regard. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 
TO NAKAI PURSUANT TO HIS DESIGNATION AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE AND REMAND IS NOT APPROPRIATE 
REGARDLESS OF THE COURT'S DECISIONS. 
Regardless of the determinations of this Court as to the equitable adoption of Mr. 
Nakai, remand for further determinations as to attorney fees awarded is not warranted. 
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Mr. Nakai submitted a fee claim in relation to his serving as personal representative of 
the estate. R. 393-405. It is undisputable "a personal representative and an attorney are 
entitled to reasonable compensation for their services." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-718 
(1992). Mr. Nakai was appointed the personal representative of the estate. Appointment 
requires the applicant to be an interested person. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(24) 
(2004) defines an "interested person" as "heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or 
the estate of the decedent, ward, or a protected person." Mr. Nakai maintained a claim as 
an equitably adopted child of Father Hannifin. Further, the meaning of an interested 
person "may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular 
purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding." Id. Accordingly, Mr. Nakai is 
appropriately an "interested person" as defined by statute. Whether or not this Court 
determines Mr. Nakai was equitably adopted by Father Hannifin, it is beyond dispute Mr. 
Nakai maintained a life-long father and son relationship with Father Hannifin and that 
Mr. Nakai was the beneficiary of the majority of Father Hannifin's assets at his death. In 
conjunction with the determinations of the trail court, there is no legal basis to deny Mr. 
Nakai attorney fees, either in general or specifically in acting as personal representative, 
as detailed in his Fee Application. R. 393-405. 
As detailed in his fee request, in acting as personal representative, Mr. Nakai acted 
in every way appropriately to identify and preserve the remaining assets of the estate, 
locating proceeds from the Western Life Insurance Company in the amount of 
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$128,197.15 and filing tax returns on behalf of Father Hannifin resulting in tax rebates in 
the amount of $2,754.00. See Fee Application, R. 395, K 10. Further, Mr. Nakai 
conducted extensive investigations into the existence of additional assets of the estate as a 
result of a trust agreement signed by Father Hannifin in 1998, located in documents 
produced by Caryl Marsh pursuant to subpoena and not previously disclosed. See 
Supplement to First Fee Application, R. 481, *([ 5. All these actions were in accordance 
with the mandate of a personal representative and were not for Nakai's personal gain. 
The actions benefitted the estate regardless of a determination of the entitled heirs might 
be. Conversely, Mr. Nakai did not seek reimbursement from the estate for attorney fees 
incurred during Caryl Marsh's failed attempt to have Mr. Nakai removed as personal 
representative, nor for the extensive fees and costs generated in preparing for, and 
proceeding through trial on Mr. Hill's objection to Mr. Nakai's Petition to Determine 
Heirs. In sum, Mr. Nakai's appointment as personal representative was proper at the 
outset, and the actions undertaken by Mr. Nakai's attorneys in reliance on this 
determination entitle them to reasonable compensation for their services, as specifically 
detailed in his Fee Requests. See In re Owens Estate, 91 P. 283, 285 (Utah 1907) (though 
administrator was erroneously appointed, still entitled to reasonable compensation on 
behalf of the estate, including attorney fees). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellee requests this Court deny Appellant's 
request to overturn In re Williams Estates and to allow the trail court's order to stand both 
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with regard to the equitable adoption of Mr. Nakai and attorney fees and costs awarded 
pursuant to his service as personal representative of the estate. 
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ADDENDUM 
APPELLEE REFERS THE COURT TO THE ADDENDUM OF APPELLANT 
FOR THOSE PARTS OF THE RECORD OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE 
DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL 
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